It's worth reviewing the War Powers Resolution as we approach a showdown over the "Surge".
War Powers Resolution
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The War Powers Act of 1973 (Public Law 93-148) limits the power of the President of the United States to wage war without the approval of Congress. The War Powers Act of 1973 is also referred to as the War Powers Resolution (Sec. 1).Contents
1 Provisions
2 History
3 Basis of Legality
4 See also
5 References
6 External links
Provisions
The purpose of the War Powers Resolution is to ensure that Congress and the President share in making decisions that may get the U.S. involved in hostilities. Portions of the War Powers Resolution require the President to consult with Congress prior to the start of any hostilities as well as regularly until U.S. armed forces are no longer engaged in hostilities (Sec. 3); and to remove U.S. armed forces from hostilities if Congress has not declared war or passed a resolution authorizing the use of force within 60 days (Sec. 5(b)). Following an official request by the President to Congress, the time limit can be extended by an additional 30 days (presumably when "unavoidable military necessity" requires additional action for a safe withdrawal).
History
Under the Constitution, war powers are divided. Congress has the power to declare war and raise and support the armed forces (Article I, Section 8), while the president is Commander in Chief (Article II, Section 2). It is generally agreed that the Commander in Chief role gives the president power to repel attacks against the United States and makes him responsible for leading the armed forces. During the Korean and Vietnam wars, the United States found itself involved for many years in situations of intense conflict without a declaration of war. Many Members of Congress became concerned with the erosion of congressional authority to decide when the United States should become involved in a war or the use of armed forces that might lead to war. The Senate and the House of Representatives achieved the 2/3 majority required to pass this joint resolution over President Nixon's veto on November 7, 1973. Presidents have submitted 118 reports to Congress as a result of the War Powers Resolution, although only one (the Mayaguez situation) cited Section 4(a)(1) or specifically stated that forces had been introduced into hostilities or imminent danger.
Congress invoked the War Powers Resolution in the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution (P.L. 98-119), which authorized the Marines to remain in Lebanon for 18 months. In addition, P.L. 102-1, authorizing the use of U.S. armed forces concerning the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, stated that it constituted specific statutory authorization within the meaning of the War Powers Resolution.
On November 9, 1993, the House used a section of the War Powers Resolution to state that U.S. forces should be withdrawn from Somalia by March 31, 1994; Congress had already taken this action in appropriations legislation. More recently, war powers have been at issue in former Yugoslavia/Bosnia/Kosovo, Iraq, Haiti, and in responding to terrorist attacks against the U.S. after September 11, 2001. After combat operations against Iraqi forces ended on February 28, 1991, the use of force to obtain Iraqi compliance with U.N. resolutions remained a War Powers issue, until the enactment of P.L. 107-243, in October 2002, which explicitly authorized the President to use force against Iraq, an authority he exercised in March 2003, and continues to exercise for military operations in Iraq.
Basis of Legality
There remain underlying questions about its constitutionality (though not a formal declaration of war) consistent with the provisions of the resolution. The reports to Congress required of the President have been drafted to state that they are "consistent with" the War Powers Resolution rather than "pursuant to" so as to take into account the Presidential position that the Resolution is unconstitutional.
One argument for the unconstitutionality of the War Powers Resolution — Philip Bobbitt's in "War Powers: An Essay on John Hart Ely's War and Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and Its Aftermath," Michigan Law Quarterly 92, no. 6 (May 1994): 1364–1400 — runs as follows: "The power to make war is not an enumerated power" and the notion that to "declare" war is to "commence" war is a "contemporary textual preconception"; the Framers of the Constitution believed that statutory authorization was the route by which the United States would be committed to war, and that 'declaration' was meant for only total wars, as shown by the history of the Quasi-War with France (1798–1800); in general, constitutional powers are not so much separated as "linked and sequenced"; Congress's control over the armed forces is "structured" by appropriation, while the president commands; thus the act of declaring war should not be fetishized. (Bobbitt, the nephew of Lyndon Johnson, also argues that "A democracy cannot… tolerate secret policies" because they undermine the legitimacy of governmental action.)
A second constitutionality argument concerns a possible breach of the 'separation of powers' doctrine. The legislature may be impeding the executive in carrying-out the Oath of Office. "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my ability; preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States." (US Constitution, Article 2, Section 1, Clause 8) This type of constitutional controversy is similar to one that occurred under President Andrew Johnson with the Tenure of Office Act (1867). In that instance, the Legislative branch attempted to control the removal of Executive branch officers.
On December 20th, 2005, ABC News reported that vice-president Dick Cheney had described the War Powers Resolution as an "infringement on the authority of the president." [1] (http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory?id=1424802&page=1)
See also
War Powers Clause (of the Constitution)
References
Richard F. Grimmett "War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance" Congressional Research Service Report. Updated February 14, 2006
External links
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/warpower.htm
Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports regarding the War Powers Resolution (http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/search.tkl?q=war+powers+resolution&search_crit=title&search=Search&date1=Anytime&date2=Anytime&type=form)
http://www.cs.indiana.edu/statecraft/warpow.html
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl32267.htm
Category: United States federal defense and national security legislation
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Wednesday, January 24, 2007
As long as we're comparing them... a small refresher on the end game in Vietnam
history lesson
How Vietnam Really Ended
Events abroad—not domestic anti-war activism—brought the war to an end.
By Gideon Rose
Posted Monday, Jan. 22, 2007, at 11:14 AM ET
With the Iraq war going badly and a hostile Congress looking for the exit, comparisons to Vietnam are all the rage. Accounts of that war's endgame have generally been spun politically or distorted by hindsight, however.
Congressional anti-war activism, for example, was neither a heroic reining in of a runaway government (as the left claims) nor a perfidious stab in the back (as the right charges). It was simply the predictable epilogue to a drama that had largely played itself out years before. And while domestic politics established the broad guidelines within which different administrations operated, White House officials had substantial leeway to set policy as they wished. The real constraints, then as now, lay not in what was saleable at home but in what was achievable abroad.
From the start, the United States was fighting not to lose in Vietnam, rather than to win. In the 1960s, U.S. leaders believed that the fall of South Vietnam to communism would have terrible consequences, so they decided to prevent such an outcome by whatever means necessary. At first, this meant providing U.S. aid and advisers; then it meant facilitating the overthrow of President Ngo Dinh Diem; then, bombing North Vietnam; and, finally, sending U.S. ground troops to fight Communist forces directly. During the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, the toughest question—whether to accept the true costs of victory or defeat—was avoided. By gradually increasing the scale of the American effort, it was hoped, the Communists could be persuaded to cease and desist.
Once the patience of the American public wore thin, such an approach was no longer feasible. The Tet Offensive soured much of the establishment on the war and inclined them toward disengagement. Johnson himself, unwilling either to withdraw or to escalate, chose instead to renounce his re-election attempt, cap the war effort, and hunker down. He never accepted defeat, but the limits he set on American operations became political facts that restricted the choices available to his successor.
Coming into office in January 1969, Richard Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, understood that part of their mandate was to end the war in some way, and they wanted to do so for their own geopolitical reasons, as well. Still, they had no intention of "losing" the war outright or of abandoning South Vietnam under pressure from the enemy. So, they tried at first to achieve an old goal—an agreement formalizing simultaneous American and North Vietnamese military disengagement—with various new means, buying breathing space at home with token troop withdrawals. But the effort failed, and the war dragged on.
By late 1969, the Nixon team settled on a new approach combining gradual withdrawal, temporary protection of the regime of South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu, and intense diplomacy to enshrine these elements in a negotiated settlement. In the spring of 1969, there were almost 550,000 American troops in Vietnam. By the spring of 1970, there were over 400,000; by the fall of 1971, 180,000; by the spring of 1972, 65,000. The troop withdrawals undermined the Thieu regime's long-term security, but Washington took other measures (such as the Phoenix Program and assaults against Communist sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos) to help protect it over the short term.
The administration did something similar at the negotiating table, formally protecting the Saigon government while ultimately agreeing to conditions that lowered its chances of survival. In September 1970, for example, Kissinger agreed that Northern troops could remain in the South after a settlement. Such a "cease-fire in place" would allow the Communist forces to renew their offensives with ease once the Americans had left; any agreement based on it would make an eventual Communist victory extremely likely. The North Vietnamese were unmoved, however, and persisted in demanding the one concession American leaders refused to make: a direct and immediate betrayal of Thieu and his government.
In the spring of 1972, the North Vietnamese launched a massive attack against the South (the "Easter Offensive") that gained ground at first but was eventually halted by South Vietnamese resistance, American tactical air support, and American strategic bombing. The Nixon administration's courting of the North's key patrons began to pay off, meanwhile, as Russia and China now sought to dampen the flames rather than fan them.
So, negotiations began to move forward, and by mid-October Kissinger and his North Vietnamese counterpart worked out a draft agreement that called for the removal of the remaining U.S. troops and the return of U.S. prisoners of war while deferring ultimate decisions about the South's political future. Kissinger knew it was the best deal available, but he also knew that it stacked the odds against the long-term survival of the Saigon regime. To bypass South Vietnamese objections, therefore, he decided to keep his negotiations secret until the last minute and then force Saigon to accept the final product.
But Thieu balked when presented with the fait accompli, pleading in tears for the Americans to hold out for better conditions. Nixon refused to force Thieu into line, so Kissinger had to tell the North Vietnamese that the signing of the agreement would be postponed. They retaliated by publicly revealing the deal (and the American commitment to it). This was the point at which Kissinger, desperate to keep the momentum moving forward, declared at a press conference that "peace is at hand."
The American presidential election came and went, but the negotiating deadlock remained. Tantalized and frustrated by the settlement at their fingertips, Nixon and his advisers decided on a final stratagem to end the war. To allay Thieu's fears, they ordered a massive quick infusion of aid to the South and promised to continue support after the agreement was signed; meanwhile, to get the North Vietnamese back to the table, they ordered devastating airstrikes.
The "Christmas bombing" succeeded in compelling Hanoi's assent while helping to cover up Washington's insistence that Saigon accept an agreement similar to the one negotiated in October. Thus pulling along a reluctant ally and enemy, the United States signed the Paris Accords on Jan. 27, 1973, formally extricating itself from the Vietnam War.
Nixon's private guarantee to Thieu in November had been clear: "You have my absolute assurance that if Hanoi fails to abide by the terms of this agreement it is my intention to take swift and severe retaliatory action." He repeated the pledge in January. Later on, he and Kissinger argued that they had always intended to carry out these promises and fully expected they would be able to do so—but they could not because Congress barred the way.
"Soon after the agreement was signed," Kissinger wrote in his memoirs, "Watergate undermined Nixon's authority and the dam holding back Congressional antiwar resolutions burst." He claimed, "The war and the peace ... won at such cost were lost within a matter of months once Congress refused to fulfill our obligations."
It is true that Congress restricted U.S. operations and cut aid to the South, and these moves did indeed facilitate the eventual Northern victory. But these events were entirely predictable; the settlement the Nixon administration negotiated left the South vulnerable to future attacks. To the American public, the most important fact about the Paris Accords was that American troops and prisoners came home; it was precisely because a guarantee of renewed U.S. military intervention would have been so controversial that Nixon had to make his promises to Thieu in secret.
After January 1973, as before, Vietnamese belligerents on both sides kept up military pressure and prepared for a final showdown. But the American public tried to blot the war out of its consciousness—and largely succeeded. A consensus formed that the United States should not re-engage and should reduce its remaining involvement still further. Reflecting this, in June 1973, Congress ordered all U.S. military operations in Indochina to cease by the end of the summer, and in November it passed the War Powers Act.
Congress also cut U.S. aid to Saigon, from about $2.3 billion in 1973 to about $1 billion in 1974 and still less after that. Together with the 1973 oil crisis, which crippled what remained of the South Vietnamese economy, this made it difficult for Saigon to use the expensive high-tech war machine it had been given. So, even if Watergate never occurred, it would have been difficult for the Nixon administration to counter Northern attacks in any substantial way. That said, the developing Watergate scandals did eliminate whatever freedom of action the administration had left.
In late 1974, the North Vietnamese leadership calculated that American re-entry to help the South was unlikely, and they launched a campaign to win the war once and for all. Their initial victories in the spring of 1975 came easily. At this point, Kissinger, now Gerald Ford's secretary of state, recommended a final desperate burst of U.S. help, but the new president acquiesced to public and congressional objections.
On April 23, Ford told a cheering crowd of students that national pride could not "be achieved by refighting a war that is finished as far as America is concerned." Thieu outlasted Nixon by eight months; on May Day 1975, Communist soldiers hoisted their flag above the erstwhile capital of South Vietnam, now Ho Chi Minh City.
It has been said that history doesn't repeat itself, but it rhymes. On the Vietnam timeline, in Iraq today the Bush administration is roughly where the Nixon administration was in 1969-70: Washington has been unable to find or create a strong and dependable local ally, the American public has lost faith, and working-level officials are desperately casting about for ways to pull off a retreat instead of a rout. One key difference, however, is that Bush himself seems to be stuck where Johnson was back in 1968—unwilling to accept that his war is in fact lost or that the game is not worth the candle. He has two years left on his personal clock. With another electoral season fast approaching, his Congressional counterparts and would-be successors have less.
Gideon Rose is managing editor of Foreign Affairs; he is writing a book about the ends of American wars.
Article URL: http://www.slate.com/id/2158016/
Copyright 2006 Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive Co. LLC
How Vietnam Really Ended
Events abroad—not domestic anti-war activism—brought the war to an end.
By Gideon Rose
Posted Monday, Jan. 22, 2007, at 11:14 AM ET
With the Iraq war going badly and a hostile Congress looking for the exit, comparisons to Vietnam are all the rage. Accounts of that war's endgame have generally been spun politically or distorted by hindsight, however.
Congressional anti-war activism, for example, was neither a heroic reining in of a runaway government (as the left claims) nor a perfidious stab in the back (as the right charges). It was simply the predictable epilogue to a drama that had largely played itself out years before. And while domestic politics established the broad guidelines within which different administrations operated, White House officials had substantial leeway to set policy as they wished. The real constraints, then as now, lay not in what was saleable at home but in what was achievable abroad.
From the start, the United States was fighting not to lose in Vietnam, rather than to win. In the 1960s, U.S. leaders believed that the fall of South Vietnam to communism would have terrible consequences, so they decided to prevent such an outcome by whatever means necessary. At first, this meant providing U.S. aid and advisers; then it meant facilitating the overthrow of President Ngo Dinh Diem; then, bombing North Vietnam; and, finally, sending U.S. ground troops to fight Communist forces directly. During the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, the toughest question—whether to accept the true costs of victory or defeat—was avoided. By gradually increasing the scale of the American effort, it was hoped, the Communists could be persuaded to cease and desist.
Once the patience of the American public wore thin, such an approach was no longer feasible. The Tet Offensive soured much of the establishment on the war and inclined them toward disengagement. Johnson himself, unwilling either to withdraw or to escalate, chose instead to renounce his re-election attempt, cap the war effort, and hunker down. He never accepted defeat, but the limits he set on American operations became political facts that restricted the choices available to his successor.
Coming into office in January 1969, Richard Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, understood that part of their mandate was to end the war in some way, and they wanted to do so for their own geopolitical reasons, as well. Still, they had no intention of "losing" the war outright or of abandoning South Vietnam under pressure from the enemy. So, they tried at first to achieve an old goal—an agreement formalizing simultaneous American and North Vietnamese military disengagement—with various new means, buying breathing space at home with token troop withdrawals. But the effort failed, and the war dragged on.
By late 1969, the Nixon team settled on a new approach combining gradual withdrawal, temporary protection of the regime of South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu, and intense diplomacy to enshrine these elements in a negotiated settlement. In the spring of 1969, there were almost 550,000 American troops in Vietnam. By the spring of 1970, there were over 400,000; by the fall of 1971, 180,000; by the spring of 1972, 65,000. The troop withdrawals undermined the Thieu regime's long-term security, but Washington took other measures (such as the Phoenix Program and assaults against Communist sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos) to help protect it over the short term.
The administration did something similar at the negotiating table, formally protecting the Saigon government while ultimately agreeing to conditions that lowered its chances of survival. In September 1970, for example, Kissinger agreed that Northern troops could remain in the South after a settlement. Such a "cease-fire in place" would allow the Communist forces to renew their offensives with ease once the Americans had left; any agreement based on it would make an eventual Communist victory extremely likely. The North Vietnamese were unmoved, however, and persisted in demanding the one concession American leaders refused to make: a direct and immediate betrayal of Thieu and his government.
In the spring of 1972, the North Vietnamese launched a massive attack against the South (the "Easter Offensive") that gained ground at first but was eventually halted by South Vietnamese resistance, American tactical air support, and American strategic bombing. The Nixon administration's courting of the North's key patrons began to pay off, meanwhile, as Russia and China now sought to dampen the flames rather than fan them.
So, negotiations began to move forward, and by mid-October Kissinger and his North Vietnamese counterpart worked out a draft agreement that called for the removal of the remaining U.S. troops and the return of U.S. prisoners of war while deferring ultimate decisions about the South's political future. Kissinger knew it was the best deal available, but he also knew that it stacked the odds against the long-term survival of the Saigon regime. To bypass South Vietnamese objections, therefore, he decided to keep his negotiations secret until the last minute and then force Saigon to accept the final product.
But Thieu balked when presented with the fait accompli, pleading in tears for the Americans to hold out for better conditions. Nixon refused to force Thieu into line, so Kissinger had to tell the North Vietnamese that the signing of the agreement would be postponed. They retaliated by publicly revealing the deal (and the American commitment to it). This was the point at which Kissinger, desperate to keep the momentum moving forward, declared at a press conference that "peace is at hand."
The American presidential election came and went, but the negotiating deadlock remained. Tantalized and frustrated by the settlement at their fingertips, Nixon and his advisers decided on a final stratagem to end the war. To allay Thieu's fears, they ordered a massive quick infusion of aid to the South and promised to continue support after the agreement was signed; meanwhile, to get the North Vietnamese back to the table, they ordered devastating airstrikes.
The "Christmas bombing" succeeded in compelling Hanoi's assent while helping to cover up Washington's insistence that Saigon accept an agreement similar to the one negotiated in October. Thus pulling along a reluctant ally and enemy, the United States signed the Paris Accords on Jan. 27, 1973, formally extricating itself from the Vietnam War.
Nixon's private guarantee to Thieu in November had been clear: "You have my absolute assurance that if Hanoi fails to abide by the terms of this agreement it is my intention to take swift and severe retaliatory action." He repeated the pledge in January. Later on, he and Kissinger argued that they had always intended to carry out these promises and fully expected they would be able to do so—but they could not because Congress barred the way.
"Soon after the agreement was signed," Kissinger wrote in his memoirs, "Watergate undermined Nixon's authority and the dam holding back Congressional antiwar resolutions burst." He claimed, "The war and the peace ... won at such cost were lost within a matter of months once Congress refused to fulfill our obligations."
It is true that Congress restricted U.S. operations and cut aid to the South, and these moves did indeed facilitate the eventual Northern victory. But these events were entirely predictable; the settlement the Nixon administration negotiated left the South vulnerable to future attacks. To the American public, the most important fact about the Paris Accords was that American troops and prisoners came home; it was precisely because a guarantee of renewed U.S. military intervention would have been so controversial that Nixon had to make his promises to Thieu in secret.
After January 1973, as before, Vietnamese belligerents on both sides kept up military pressure and prepared for a final showdown. But the American public tried to blot the war out of its consciousness—and largely succeeded. A consensus formed that the United States should not re-engage and should reduce its remaining involvement still further. Reflecting this, in June 1973, Congress ordered all U.S. military operations in Indochina to cease by the end of the summer, and in November it passed the War Powers Act.
Congress also cut U.S. aid to Saigon, from about $2.3 billion in 1973 to about $1 billion in 1974 and still less after that. Together with the 1973 oil crisis, which crippled what remained of the South Vietnamese economy, this made it difficult for Saigon to use the expensive high-tech war machine it had been given. So, even if Watergate never occurred, it would have been difficult for the Nixon administration to counter Northern attacks in any substantial way. That said, the developing Watergate scandals did eliminate whatever freedom of action the administration had left.
In late 1974, the North Vietnamese leadership calculated that American re-entry to help the South was unlikely, and they launched a campaign to win the war once and for all. Their initial victories in the spring of 1975 came easily. At this point, Kissinger, now Gerald Ford's secretary of state, recommended a final desperate burst of U.S. help, but the new president acquiesced to public and congressional objections.
On April 23, Ford told a cheering crowd of students that national pride could not "be achieved by refighting a war that is finished as far as America is concerned." Thieu outlasted Nixon by eight months; on May Day 1975, Communist soldiers hoisted their flag above the erstwhile capital of South Vietnam, now Ho Chi Minh City.
It has been said that history doesn't repeat itself, but it rhymes. On the Vietnam timeline, in Iraq today the Bush administration is roughly where the Nixon administration was in 1969-70: Washington has been unable to find or create a strong and dependable local ally, the American public has lost faith, and working-level officials are desperately casting about for ways to pull off a retreat instead of a rout. One key difference, however, is that Bush himself seems to be stuck where Johnson was back in 1968—unwilling to accept that his war is in fact lost or that the game is not worth the candle. He has two years left on his personal clock. With another electoral season fast approaching, his Congressional counterparts and would-be successors have less.
Gideon Rose is managing editor of Foreign Affairs; he is writing a book about the ends of American wars.
Article URL: http://www.slate.com/id/2158016/
Copyright 2006 Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive Co. LLC
Taboo political subjects...
It is nearly impossible to find stories connecting these kinds of dots in MSM. Our political system has been completely undermined by cold, hard cash. Is there really any doubt?
The Iraq War and Crony Democracy
By Henry Pelifian
t r u t h o u t | Guest Contributor
Wednesday 24 January 2007
Has our form of government evolved into crony democracy? What is crony democracy, and how does it relate to the Iraq War? What is crony capitalism? Let us start with crony capitalism, for it begins there.
Crony capitalism is the practice of government supporting specific companies or industries for favorable treatment in legislation, government grants, legal permits and beneficial tax laws. The concepts of open competition and free markets do not apply, because government actively intervenes to assist privileged corporations. In crony capitalism, there is a close relationship between government and corporations, and their actions towards each other are mutually financially beneficial. National laws and regulations are enacted that provide special permission for particular companies for acquisitions, mergers, real estate transactions and tax benefits. The quid pro quo for Republican and Democratic politicians are campaign donations, future jobs for themselves or relatives, and are disguised or hidden perks in exchange for favorable legislation for privileged organizations. Crony democracy occurs when crony capitalism merges with democracy, with major players becoming interchangeable with the lobbying promoting it.
President Eisenhower's warning about the military-industrial complex's undue and adverse influence on the country was prescient and prophetic. Contracts for military hardware were the hallmark of the military-industrial complex in his era. Now it has extended and grown to taking over logistic and myriad other functions of the US military and government overseas, often creating a revolving chair of government and corporate employees securing government contracts domestically and internationally by using high-level contacts while in government for private gain. It appears that the concept of public service has become a major instrument for accessing and obtaining wealth. There is little prohibition of our elected and appointed former government officials to work for private companies, using their influence to assist in securing high-value government contracts.
A prime example of crony capitalism, extensively outlined in Robert Bryce's book "Cronies" is the company Brown and Root, with its subsidiary Halliburton garnering billions of dollars worth of government contracts in Iraq. Vice President Dick Cheney is Halliburton's former chief executive officer. Cheney traded his government contacts when he was hired by Halliburton for domestic and foreign contracts with people with whom he formerly had conducted official business. There was no conflict of interest charge against Vice President Cheney when his former firm Halliburton secured billions of dollars of US government contracts in Iraq.
Mr. Bryce states in his book that Dick Cheney departed Halliburton after five years with a retirement package worth $33.7 million dollars, shortly before being sworn in as vice president of the United States. Vice President Cheney also received deferred compensation from Halliburton totaling nearly $400,000 while in office.
In "Cronies," it is clear why Halliburton hired Mr. Cheney, for he "knew how to vacuum up federal money and federal contracts." Other facts from "Cronies": During Cheney's tenure at Halliburton, he nearly doubled the amount of federal contracts to $2.3 billion. Also, Cheney assisted the parent company, Brown & Root, in receiving a fifteenfold increase in federally backed loans and insurance from the Export-Import Bank and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. Mr. Cheney understood the importance of lobbying, for he doubled political donations while at Halliburton.
According to the Center for Public Integrity and mentioned in "Cronies," seventy companies and individuals who were substantial contributors to the Bush-Cheney campaign have been awarded billions of dollars in contracts in Iraq.
Have we become a nation of lobbyists, for lobbyists, and by lobbyists? The crony democracy chain links politicians, government appointees, corporations, government contracts and lobbyists. The chain includes interchangeable employment with each successive administration from government officials to corporate CEO or Washington lobbyist. The goal is profit at government expense. What is the financial calculation of waste and abuse in such a system?
Should it be legal for former government employees to use their prior government experience to enrich themselves by securing lucrative government contracts? What is the public interest? The question is not only about Cheney. What of the many other former government and military employees who trade their government experience and influence for private gain? When is former government service, especially by high-ranking officials, an abuse of the public trust, when they use their influence for private gain?
Is elected office just another avenue to gain access to wealth and privilege? Should there be a long-term prohibition of elected officials and retired military personnel from working with firms the government has done business with?
We have now embarked upon a new age of crony democracy, where each of the two major political parties, Democratic and Republican, exclusively harness hundreds of millions of dollars from corporations and others to campaign for public office. Crony democracy requires cronies. Former Secretary of State James Baker III's law firm Baker Botts handles the legal affairs of Halliburton, Exxon-Mobil and an assortment of major companies for annual revenues of $362 million dollars, according to the book "Cronies." Former employees of Baker Botts have been appointed to such jobs as ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Department of Justice lawyer heading up the anti-trust division with oversight over energy issues.
Is it plausible for Americans to ask, Were the corporations that Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld had close relationships with a factor in the decision-making process to attack Iraq, since many of these companies secured multimillion or multibillion-dollar government contracts as a result of the Iraq War? Were government contracts directly relating to the Iraq War signed with companies with Bush-Cheney-Rumsfeld connections prior to the attack on Iraq, and is this a conflict of interest?
The answer is not in stars; it is in intense scrutiny of the ever-widening circle of the military-industrial complex and implementing legislation that is currently absent, by curtailing or curbing or eliminating this new age of crony capitalism and crony democracy that has descended upon the American people and their government.
--------
Henry Pelifian's background includes public and private sector experience and an MBA in International Management. He has served many years overseas, including two years (1966-1968 ); an honorable discharge from US Army service in Vietnam (1967-1968), and the US Peace Corps in Thailand (1975-1977). He has written several works of fiction based on his experiences overseas. His parents were born in Turkey and escaped the Armenian Genocide. His father entered the US in 1921, and his mother's family went to France.
The Iraq War and Crony Democracy
By Henry Pelifian
t r u t h o u t | Guest Contributor
Wednesday 24 January 2007
Has our form of government evolved into crony democracy? What is crony democracy, and how does it relate to the Iraq War? What is crony capitalism? Let us start with crony capitalism, for it begins there.
Crony capitalism is the practice of government supporting specific companies or industries for favorable treatment in legislation, government grants, legal permits and beneficial tax laws. The concepts of open competition and free markets do not apply, because government actively intervenes to assist privileged corporations. In crony capitalism, there is a close relationship between government and corporations, and their actions towards each other are mutually financially beneficial. National laws and regulations are enacted that provide special permission for particular companies for acquisitions, mergers, real estate transactions and tax benefits. The quid pro quo for Republican and Democratic politicians are campaign donations, future jobs for themselves or relatives, and are disguised or hidden perks in exchange for favorable legislation for privileged organizations. Crony democracy occurs when crony capitalism merges with democracy, with major players becoming interchangeable with the lobbying promoting it.
President Eisenhower's warning about the military-industrial complex's undue and adverse influence on the country was prescient and prophetic. Contracts for military hardware were the hallmark of the military-industrial complex in his era. Now it has extended and grown to taking over logistic and myriad other functions of the US military and government overseas, often creating a revolving chair of government and corporate employees securing government contracts domestically and internationally by using high-level contacts while in government for private gain. It appears that the concept of public service has become a major instrument for accessing and obtaining wealth. There is little prohibition of our elected and appointed former government officials to work for private companies, using their influence to assist in securing high-value government contracts.
A prime example of crony capitalism, extensively outlined in Robert Bryce's book "Cronies" is the company Brown and Root, with its subsidiary Halliburton garnering billions of dollars worth of government contracts in Iraq. Vice President Dick Cheney is Halliburton's former chief executive officer. Cheney traded his government contacts when he was hired by Halliburton for domestic and foreign contracts with people with whom he formerly had conducted official business. There was no conflict of interest charge against Vice President Cheney when his former firm Halliburton secured billions of dollars of US government contracts in Iraq.
Mr. Bryce states in his book that Dick Cheney departed Halliburton after five years with a retirement package worth $33.7 million dollars, shortly before being sworn in as vice president of the United States. Vice President Cheney also received deferred compensation from Halliburton totaling nearly $400,000 while in office.
In "Cronies," it is clear why Halliburton hired Mr. Cheney, for he "knew how to vacuum up federal money and federal contracts." Other facts from "Cronies": During Cheney's tenure at Halliburton, he nearly doubled the amount of federal contracts to $2.3 billion. Also, Cheney assisted the parent company, Brown & Root, in receiving a fifteenfold increase in federally backed loans and insurance from the Export-Import Bank and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. Mr. Cheney understood the importance of lobbying, for he doubled political donations while at Halliburton.
According to the Center for Public Integrity and mentioned in "Cronies," seventy companies and individuals who were substantial contributors to the Bush-Cheney campaign have been awarded billions of dollars in contracts in Iraq.
Have we become a nation of lobbyists, for lobbyists, and by lobbyists? The crony democracy chain links politicians, government appointees, corporations, government contracts and lobbyists. The chain includes interchangeable employment with each successive administration from government officials to corporate CEO or Washington lobbyist. The goal is profit at government expense. What is the financial calculation of waste and abuse in such a system?
Should it be legal for former government employees to use their prior government experience to enrich themselves by securing lucrative government contracts? What is the public interest? The question is not only about Cheney. What of the many other former government and military employees who trade their government experience and influence for private gain? When is former government service, especially by high-ranking officials, an abuse of the public trust, when they use their influence for private gain?
Is elected office just another avenue to gain access to wealth and privilege? Should there be a long-term prohibition of elected officials and retired military personnel from working with firms the government has done business with?
We have now embarked upon a new age of crony democracy, where each of the two major political parties, Democratic and Republican, exclusively harness hundreds of millions of dollars from corporations and others to campaign for public office. Crony democracy requires cronies. Former Secretary of State James Baker III's law firm Baker Botts handles the legal affairs of Halliburton, Exxon-Mobil and an assortment of major companies for annual revenues of $362 million dollars, according to the book "Cronies." Former employees of Baker Botts have been appointed to such jobs as ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Department of Justice lawyer heading up the anti-trust division with oversight over energy issues.
Is it plausible for Americans to ask, Were the corporations that Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld had close relationships with a factor in the decision-making process to attack Iraq, since many of these companies secured multimillion or multibillion-dollar government contracts as a result of the Iraq War? Were government contracts directly relating to the Iraq War signed with companies with Bush-Cheney-Rumsfeld connections prior to the attack on Iraq, and is this a conflict of interest?
The answer is not in stars; it is in intense scrutiny of the ever-widening circle of the military-industrial complex and implementing legislation that is currently absent, by curtailing or curbing or eliminating this new age of crony capitalism and crony democracy that has descended upon the American people and their government.
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Henry Pelifian's background includes public and private sector experience and an MBA in International Management. He has served many years overseas, including two years (1966-1968 ); an honorable discharge from US Army service in Vietnam (1967-1968), and the US Peace Corps in Thailand (1975-1977). He has written several works of fiction based on his experiences overseas. His parents were born in Turkey and escaped the Armenian Genocide. His father entered the US in 1921, and his mother's family went to France.
Tuesday, January 02, 2007
The Great Terror and ruminations about a forgotten pardon
I don't know about you, but since I first heard the use of the phrase, "The War on Terror", I've had this weird deja vu about having heard it before.... it was so familiar, but not distant... A war against an emotional reaction has always seemed, well, a little silly, but in a darkly fantastical way. After all the years with this nagging feeling pulling on my subconscious, I finally happened across this piece by Stephen Lendman which brought it all flooding back. The French Revolution was never really a favorite period for me, but this is a solid piece of scholorship noting the amazing similarities between the NeoCon agenda and that of the post-Revolutionary Jacobins.
The second weirdness came up in the wake of Gerald Ford's wake. The era and events that unfolded around Ford's pardoning of Nixon was, for a lot of folks like myself, a history that is almost mythological. I was truly surprised after reading this piece from Slate. Who knew that Veep Agnew resigned just eight months before Nixon with the threat of prosecution on his heals. Ford's decision to protect America from "our long national nightmare" now seems quite quaint, as anyone that was exposed to the Lewinski scandle would attest to. I find myself leaning towards the idea that the Nixon pardon - for crimes not even defined at the time - established a bad precedent that has rippled through time, corrupting as it aged. Bush I's pardoning of key players in the Iran-Contra scandle rushes to the front of the line, particularly the pardon of Cap just 12 days before he was to go on trial for purjury, a case where H.W. could have found himself a material witness... Connecting the dots was supposed to be fun and informative, but it's really just informative.
The second weirdness came up in the wake of Gerald Ford's wake. The era and events that unfolded around Ford's pardoning of Nixon was, for a lot of folks like myself, a history that is almost mythological. I was truly surprised after reading this piece from Slate. Who knew that Veep Agnew resigned just eight months before Nixon with the threat of prosecution on his heals. Ford's decision to protect America from "our long national nightmare" now seems quite quaint, as anyone that was exposed to the Lewinski scandle would attest to. I find myself leaning towards the idea that the Nixon pardon - for crimes not even defined at the time - established a bad precedent that has rippled through time, corrupting as it aged. Bush I's pardoning of key players in the Iran-Contra scandle rushes to the front of the line, particularly the pardon of Cap just 12 days before he was to go on trial for purjury, a case where H.W. could have found himself a material witness... Connecting the dots was supposed to be fun and informative, but it's really just informative.
Tuesday, December 26, 2006
WTF - "The Surge"
Dear God (or Allah or Zeus or Tinkerbell), please tell me that my government is not going to wad up another 30-50k U.S. troops and throw them into the hell of Iraq. What could possibly be gained? Raise your hand if you think that one year from now we'll be drinking a toast to our great victory over "Terrorism"? Raise your hand if you think that ten years from now we'll be toasting the end of the "longest night"? Raise your hand if you think that by fighting in Iraq we're heading off a fight in the streets of Philadelphia against the terrorists? Come on.... honestly folks, what do we really think can happen once we "Surge" into Iraq... will they be shocked'd and awd'd, i.e., WOW'd more than they already are?
This is a foolish idea brought to us by folks that are having difficulties proving they can manage their way out of a closet. Jane Smiley has a nice piece on the historical perspective, but this Mark Benjamin's Solon article on the historical perspective of the U.S. fighting forces since 9/11 is very illuminating and worth the 4.5 minutes to read.
Raise your hand if you'd like to see the folks managing "Bush's Charge" lead from out front for a change...
This is a foolish idea brought to us by folks that are having difficulties proving they can manage their way out of a closet. Jane Smiley has a nice piece on the historical perspective, but this Mark Benjamin's Solon article on the historical perspective of the U.S. fighting forces since 9/11 is very illuminating and worth the 4.5 minutes to read.
Raise your hand if you'd like to see the folks managing "Bush's Charge" lead from out front for a change...
Monday, December 11, 2006
Stephen Pizzo's piece on physical evidence that Bush is slipping into the abyss...
My Brother is a big fan of Pizzo.... after reading a few of his pieces from http://www.newsforreal.com/, I can see why.
Call Me Crazy
But Think I've Been Here Before
By Stephen Pizzo
Created Dec 9 2006 - 9:13am
Remember Watergate? I sure do. I lived through the entire sorted mess. But yesterday a particularly chilling image from those days returned to haunt my imagination. It was at the height of the crisis. Nixon, hunkered down in the Oval Office, buzzed his secretary and asked for his chief of staff, Al Haig.
When Haig walked in Nixon thrust a pill bottle at him. It was Valium. A frustrated Nixon asked Haig to open it for him. The bottle had a child-proof cap Nixon could not dislodge. As Haig went to open the bottle he noticed the cap had been nearly chewed off.
I always considered that moment -- an American president, the most powerful person on earth, in emotional free fall and desperately chewing the cap of tranquiler bottle -- the most frightening image of my life. That is, until this week.
This week I saw that look again. It was the look Richard Nixon had just weeks before the Valium bottle incident. It's hard to describe, but unmistakable -- an unsettling combination of nonsensical defiance, confusion, Captain Queeg-like paranoia with a dash of self-pity.
I saw that look in George W. Bush's face twice this week. The first time was during his Wednesday morning photo-op with the members of the Baker/Hamilton Commission. The best way to describe Bush's manner is that he seemed untethered from what everyone else in the nation considered a momentous moment. He lacked even appropriate voice inflection, delivering disjointed and rambling comments in a monotone. His comments were so bland and generic he might as well have been responding to a report from a local Rotary Club on the importance of good street lighting fighting street crime.
It was at that moment the thought first popped into my mind, “Whoa! This guy – or someone else – must have gotten the Valium bottle open this morning!”
It was just a guess, but the next day I was certain of it. It was during Bush's press conference with Tony Blair. At least Tony Blair looked appropriately concerned. Bush, on the other hand, looked lost. His performance reminded me of a stand-up comedian that suddenly discovers no one is laughing at the only jokes he knows any more. So he desperately tries them all, one after the other. When no one laughs at one joke he moves quickly to the next, then the next.... He tries all his golden oldies, but the audience just sits there. Some snicker, not at the jokes, but at the clueless guy on stage. Some get up and leave. A few actually heckle.
No one was buying Bush's old saws at Thursday's press conference. And he tried them all --- The, “Fight them there so we don't have to fight them here,” .... The , “if we leave before defeating them in Iraq they will follow us home.” .... The, “it's hard. I know it's hard.” ...
Nothing.
Worse than nothing. A British reporter asked him why he seemed to be the only person left not ready to admit things in Iraq are really bad. Bush got a glazed, far away look in his eyes -- the kind of look my dog gets on his fury face when ask if he had anything to do with dog dodo on the living room carpet. The answer was one not part of his usual act. He had to adlib. So it took awhile.
Finally he spoke: “Okay, It's bad.” Bush responded... followed by another long pause.
There was no laughter – except his own head-bobbing,“heh, heh, heh,” hint to the audience that he had just made a new joke. Only silence.
When no one reacted, he fished, “Is that better?” he pleaded. More silence. "I know it's hard. I understand that..." (It was an echo of Nixon's “Your president is not a crook,” declaration. Hell, I assumed most politicians are crooks. I wasn't worried that Dick Nixon was a crook. I was worried he was nuts.)
At a Senate hearing yesterday James Baker warned that the commission's report “should not be treated like a fruit salad, picking this, rejecting that.” That missed the point. We are not worried that the commission's report is a fruit salad, but that the guy they wrote it for is.
During Watergate the nation was spared the sad, and potentially dangerous, specter of a sitting president going stark raving mad in office. Adults in Nixon's own party conducted an intervention, leading their emotionally – and increasingly mentally – crippled leader safely off the world stage. It was an act of both statesmanship and patriotism by that handful of sage-like Republicans. It was also an act of kindness and compassion for a mortally wounded leader -- albeit the wounds were self-inflected.
So, is George W. Bush cracked or cracking? Or is what I witnessed this week just more of the uninformed, spoiled, arrogant little putz that 71% of us have come to dislike. Only time will tell -- but time is short.
President Bush hinted he would give a major speech before Christmas during which he plans to show Americans -- and the world – that he really is in touch with reality. But everything I know about George W. Bush argues against any sudden redemption. Because, as Oscar Wilde correctly pointed out, “Consistency is the last refuge of the unimaginative.” And no president in America's history has been less imaginative than George W. Bush.
But if GWB is anything he's stubborn. Consistently so. Trouble is facts are even more stubborn. And it's facts now --- not Democrats, not surrender monkeys, not cut-and-runners, not the French, not the UN, not Michael Moore, not Cindy Sheehan – but the facts confronting George W. Bush. And facts can't be silenced by calling them names or insinuating they are "unpatriotic" facts. Facts are just what they are, nothing more, nothing less. And the facts on the ground in Iraq are ugly and will get even uglier in the weeks and months ahead.
The next few months will be very hard on Bush 43. Maybe too hard. We may see the weight of it all too much for a guy accustomed to getting his own way and never having to acknowledge, much less clean up, his own messes.
While we have not yet seen George the Younger crack in public, his father has. At a recent award ceremony for his other son, Jeb, George-the-Elder broke down sobbing. He said it was out of pride for Jeb. But I suspect it had a lot more to do with his concern for what he knows is in store for his other son, the one in the White House. He tried to warn young George against whacking Saddam, that doing so could spark a full scale mob war in that rough neighborhood. Now it's too late. War – civil war – will consume Iraq, and possibly ignite a full scale Sunni v. Shiite war in the Middle East. And Bush Sr. knows that the resulting mess will go down in history with the Bush family name stamped all over it.
The Baker/Hamilton commission has tried to show Bush Jr. a graceful -- if unavoidably ignoble -- path out of Iraq. But what may really be needed in the weeks ahead is someone ready to, not just crack open the Valium bottle for George W. Bush, but the door leading out of the Oval Office.
"Yes Mr.President. The way forward. It's right through here sir."
Call Me Crazy
But Think I've Been Here Before
By Stephen Pizzo
Created Dec 9 2006 - 9:13am
Remember Watergate? I sure do. I lived through the entire sorted mess. But yesterday a particularly chilling image from those days returned to haunt my imagination. It was at the height of the crisis. Nixon, hunkered down in the Oval Office, buzzed his secretary and asked for his chief of staff, Al Haig.
When Haig walked in Nixon thrust a pill bottle at him. It was Valium. A frustrated Nixon asked Haig to open it for him. The bottle had a child-proof cap Nixon could not dislodge. As Haig went to open the bottle he noticed the cap had been nearly chewed off.
I always considered that moment -- an American president, the most powerful person on earth, in emotional free fall and desperately chewing the cap of tranquiler bottle -- the most frightening image of my life. That is, until this week.
This week I saw that look again. It was the look Richard Nixon had just weeks before the Valium bottle incident. It's hard to describe, but unmistakable -- an unsettling combination of nonsensical defiance, confusion, Captain Queeg-like paranoia with a dash of self-pity.
I saw that look in George W. Bush's face twice this week. The first time was during his Wednesday morning photo-op with the members of the Baker/Hamilton Commission. The best way to describe Bush's manner is that he seemed untethered from what everyone else in the nation considered a momentous moment. He lacked even appropriate voice inflection, delivering disjointed and rambling comments in a monotone. His comments were so bland and generic he might as well have been responding to a report from a local Rotary Club on the importance of good street lighting fighting street crime.
It was at that moment the thought first popped into my mind, “Whoa! This guy – or someone else – must have gotten the Valium bottle open this morning!”
It was just a guess, but the next day I was certain of it. It was during Bush's press conference with Tony Blair. At least Tony Blair looked appropriately concerned. Bush, on the other hand, looked lost. His performance reminded me of a stand-up comedian that suddenly discovers no one is laughing at the only jokes he knows any more. So he desperately tries them all, one after the other. When no one laughs at one joke he moves quickly to the next, then the next.... He tries all his golden oldies, but the audience just sits there. Some snicker, not at the jokes, but at the clueless guy on stage. Some get up and leave. A few actually heckle.
No one was buying Bush's old saws at Thursday's press conference. And he tried them all --- The, “Fight them there so we don't have to fight them here,” .... The , “if we leave before defeating them in Iraq they will follow us home.” .... The, “it's hard. I know it's hard.” ...
Nothing.
Worse than nothing. A British reporter asked him why he seemed to be the only person left not ready to admit things in Iraq are really bad. Bush got a glazed, far away look in his eyes -- the kind of look my dog gets on his fury face when ask if he had anything to do with dog dodo on the living room carpet. The answer was one not part of his usual act. He had to adlib. So it took awhile.
Finally he spoke: “Okay, It's bad.” Bush responded... followed by another long pause.
There was no laughter – except his own head-bobbing,“heh, heh, heh,” hint to the audience that he had just made a new joke. Only silence.
When no one reacted, he fished, “Is that better?” he pleaded. More silence. "I know it's hard. I understand that..." (It was an echo of Nixon's “Your president is not a crook,” declaration. Hell, I assumed most politicians are crooks. I wasn't worried that Dick Nixon was a crook. I was worried he was nuts.)
At a Senate hearing yesterday James Baker warned that the commission's report “should not be treated like a fruit salad, picking this, rejecting that.” That missed the point. We are not worried that the commission's report is a fruit salad, but that the guy they wrote it for is.
During Watergate the nation was spared the sad, and potentially dangerous, specter of a sitting president going stark raving mad in office. Adults in Nixon's own party conducted an intervention, leading their emotionally – and increasingly mentally – crippled leader safely off the world stage. It was an act of both statesmanship and patriotism by that handful of sage-like Republicans. It was also an act of kindness and compassion for a mortally wounded leader -- albeit the wounds were self-inflected.
So, is George W. Bush cracked or cracking? Or is what I witnessed this week just more of the uninformed, spoiled, arrogant little putz that 71% of us have come to dislike. Only time will tell -- but time is short.
President Bush hinted he would give a major speech before Christmas during which he plans to show Americans -- and the world – that he really is in touch with reality. But everything I know about George W. Bush argues against any sudden redemption. Because, as Oscar Wilde correctly pointed out, “Consistency is the last refuge of the unimaginative.” And no president in America's history has been less imaginative than George W. Bush.
But if GWB is anything he's stubborn. Consistently so. Trouble is facts are even more stubborn. And it's facts now --- not Democrats, not surrender monkeys, not cut-and-runners, not the French, not the UN, not Michael Moore, not Cindy Sheehan – but the facts confronting George W. Bush. And facts can't be silenced by calling them names or insinuating they are "unpatriotic" facts. Facts are just what they are, nothing more, nothing less. And the facts on the ground in Iraq are ugly and will get even uglier in the weeks and months ahead.
The next few months will be very hard on Bush 43. Maybe too hard. We may see the weight of it all too much for a guy accustomed to getting his own way and never having to acknowledge, much less clean up, his own messes.
While we have not yet seen George the Younger crack in public, his father has. At a recent award ceremony for his other son, Jeb, George-the-Elder broke down sobbing. He said it was out of pride for Jeb. But I suspect it had a lot more to do with his concern for what he knows is in store for his other son, the one in the White House. He tried to warn young George against whacking Saddam, that doing so could spark a full scale mob war in that rough neighborhood. Now it's too late. War – civil war – will consume Iraq, and possibly ignite a full scale Sunni v. Shiite war in the Middle East. And Bush Sr. knows that the resulting mess will go down in history with the Bush family name stamped all over it.
The Baker/Hamilton commission has tried to show Bush Jr. a graceful -- if unavoidably ignoble -- path out of Iraq. But what may really be needed in the weeks ahead is someone ready to, not just crack open the Valium bottle for George W. Bush, but the door leading out of the Oval Office.
"Yes Mr.President. The way forward. It's right through here sir."
Friday, December 08, 2006
Scientific Fundamentalism
It's just as scary as religious fundamentalism, and in fact justifies the position of religious fundamentalism that science and religion are "mutually opposed and exclusive worldviews". Lakshmi Chaudhry does a nice job of pointing out the effects of "fundamental" intolerance in her article on Richard Dawkins documentary, The Root of All Evil.
For another perspective, I recommend Bill Moyers "Faith and Reason". I believe the questions of why things happened the way they did are much more complex than Dawkins admits, and the world is not drawn in two tones.
For another perspective, I recommend Bill Moyers "Faith and Reason". I believe the questions of why things happened the way they did are much more complex than Dawkins admits, and the world is not drawn in two tones.
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